杨卫东,李桂波

• 1:天津师范大学政治与行政学院
• 2:山东管理学院人文学院

摘要(Abstract)：

[目的/意义]美国智库是政府决策链上重要的组成部分，研究其基于战略焦虑如何构建针对“全球南方”的战略叙事，有助于在批判反思的基础上提升中国自身叙事实践能力。[方法/过程]本文选取13家美国主流智库54份代表性的“全球南方”研究报告，采取文献分析法、文本分析法等，综合分析美国智库的主导性战略叙事构建。[结果/结论]美国智库将“全球南方”视为地缘政治棋盘中的“新边疆”，寄希望于通过身份争夺、规则重塑、全域性遏制等叙事维护并拓展美国利益；聚焦混淆对“全球南方”的身份认同、构建“引领者—秩序挑战者”对垒的叙事以及塑造全域竞争遏制的叙事，体现系统叙事层面的分层叙事张力与矛盾，身份叙事层面制造“他者化”与分化叙事，问题叙事层面的“工具化”与“阵营化”倾向等叙事特点。

关键词(KeyWords)： 美国智库;战略焦虑;“全球南方”;战略叙事

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家社会科学基金重点项目“国际秩序变化对美国对外战略调整影响的研究”（项目编号：22AGJ003）阶段性成果

作者(Author): 杨卫东,李桂波

DOI: 10.19318/j.cnki.issn.2096-1634.20250611.0004

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• (1)使用Python语言对54个研究报告，经去除标点、停用词，考虑否定词对焦虑词义的反转，结合焦虑词典worrywords的焦虑赋值，综合获得单篇报告的焦虑表述占比。